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ONLINE AUCTION HOUSES: 
HOW TRADEMARK OWNERS PROTECT 




A robin’s-egg-blue box with a clean white ribbon is a 
recognizable image all over the world. This visual and the 
trademarked color have come to symbolize luxury and 
exclusivity, and by extension, TIFFANY & CO (“Tiffany”)1 has 
leveraged its brand to do more than represent a product. It 
represents a lifestyle. The strength of Tiffany’s time-honored 
brand can be traced to the dedicated protection of its image. By 
vigorously managing its brand,2 a company like Tiffany extends 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2007; B.A. University of 
Virginia, 1997. The author wishes to thank Taylor Blanchard, Jennifer Sutton 
and Robert English for their time, friendship and editing expertise. She also 
acknowledges Anastasia Danias who first introduced her to this issue. 
1 Tiffany is a purveyor of high-quality goods, including specialty gift 
items such as jewelry, silver, china, glassware, crystal and clocks, under the 
trademark and trade name Tiffany and its variant Tiffany & Co. Tiffany 
spent approximately $395 million in advertising and promotion for fiscal 
years 2003-2005. Tiffany & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at K-12 
(March 31, 2006). 
2 Internal brand management strategies can include: 
restricting employee authority to use, license, or alter the brand 
without approval; creating a brand standards committee or 
trademark czar to monitor and approve brand use; limiting the 
number of vendors that provide branded products to the 
company; standardizing contracts to protect brand use; 
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“influence beyond its own domain, which helps maintain the 
integrity of distribution channels, establishes a higher level of 
branding consistency, drives revenue, increases market share, 
and improves customer loyalty.”3 Counterfeiting4 and trademark5 
infringement6 in connection with a brand7 pose tremendous 
                                                          
establishing a licensing program; requiring employee education 
on brand use; and requiring employees and vendors to obtain 
copies of company trademarks from a single source. 
TALCOTT J. FRANKLIN, PROTECTING THE BRAND: A CONCISE GUIDE TO 
PROMOTING, MAINTAINING, AND PROTECTING A COMPANY’S MOST 
VALUABLE ASSET 71 (2003). 
3 BRIAN H. MURRAY, DEFENDING THE BRAND: AGGRESSIVE STRATEGIES 
FOR PROTECTING YOUR BRAND IN THE ONLINE ARENA 3 (2004). 
4 Counterfeiting is defined as: “To unlawfully forge, copy, or imitate an 
item . . . or to possess such an item without authorization and with the intent 
to deceive or defraud by presenting the item as genuine.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 376 (8th ed. 2004). The Lanham Act defines a counterfeit mark 
as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable 
from, a registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act of 1984 defines a counterfeit mark as: 
a spurious mark that is used in connection with trafficking in 
goods or services that is identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from a mark in use and registered on the 
principal register for those goods or services and the use of 
which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deceive . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006). 
5 A trademark is a “word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by 
a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of 
others. The main purpose of a trademark is to designate the source of goods 
or services.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1530 (8th ed. 2004). 
6 A trademark infringer is any person who shall, without the consent of 
the registrant: 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods 
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a 
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, 
or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, 
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in 
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
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threats to the company’s business and good name. Tiffany, 
perfectly aware of this fact, is currently suing eBay, Inc. 
(“eBay”), claiming that counterfeit jewelry sold on the auction 
site “has eroded the reputation of the 150-year-old Tiffany 
brand.”8 
From counterfeit jewelry to golf clubs, the scope and the 
scale of high-quality counterfeit products are growing at rapid 
speed.9 Technological innovations have made it possible to 
create a near-perfect copy of products. These forgeries are then 
                                                          
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1) (1994). 
7  Further,  
[b]y protecting established trademarks against confusing 
imitation, the law ensures a reliable vocabulary for 
communications between producers and consumers. Both sellers 
and buyers benefit from the ability to trust this vocabulary to 
mean what it says it means. Sellers benefit because they can 
invest in goodwill with the knowledge that others will not 
appropriate it. Consumers benefit because they don’t have to do 
exhaustive research or even spend extra time looking at labels 
before making a purchase; they can know, based on a brand 
name, that a product has the features they are seeking. 
Trademark law, in other words, aims to promote rigorous, 
truthful competition in the marketplace by preserving the clarity 
of the language of trade.  
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Symposium: Trademark in Transition: 
Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium: Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787-88 
(2004). 
8 Michael Bobelian, Tiffany and eBay Clash Over Sales of Fake Goods, 
NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Col. 4 (Aug. 19, 2004). 
9 The International Chamber of Commerce estimates that 5-7% of world 
trade consists of counterfeit goods and that the counterfeit market is estimated 
at $600 billion annually. International Anti-counterfeiting Coalition, 
http://www.iacc.org/counterfeiting/counterfeiting.php (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006). Internet auction fraud is the most reported offense, comprising of 
62.7% of the complaints. INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, 2005 IC3 
ANNUAL REPORT 3, available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/ 
annualreports.aspx. 
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easily distributed worldwide through the Internet, and in 
particular, through online auctions10 sites such as eBay.com,11 
Amazon.com,12 Yahoo.com,13 uBid.com,14 and 
Overstock.com.15 These online auction houses have quickly 
grown into mainstream shopping venues, reshaping consumer 
buying and selling behavior.16 
The popularity and growth of online auctions present a 
variety of regulatory problems. The anonymity of buyers and 
sellers,17 the vast quantity of goods passing through the site, and 
the short timeframe of auctions make policing counterfeits 
difficult. Many online auction sites attempt to prohibit the sale 
of counterfeit and infringing merchandise in their terms and 
conditions or user agreements.18 The language of these legal 
contracts is drafted specifically in attempt to circumvent 
secondary liability.19 Some websites accept and investigate 
                                                          
10 For an overview of P2P online auction business models, see Peter R. 
Wurman, Online Auction Site Management, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
VOL. 2 709-19 (2004), available at http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/ 
wurman/Papers/Wurman-article.pdf. See also DAVID BUNNELL, THE EBAY 
PHENOMENON: BUSINESS SECRETS BEHIND THE WORLD’S HOTTEST INTERNET 
COMPANY 13 (2002). 
11 eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
12 Amazon, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
13 Yahoo, http://auctions.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
14 uBid, http://www.ubid.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
15 Overstock, http://www.overstock.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
16 For additional reading on how online marketplaces are re-shaping 
consumer culture, see generally DANIEL NISSANOFF, HOW THE NEW AUCTION 
CULTURE WILL REVOLUTIONIZE THE WAY WE BUY, SELL AND GET THE 
THINGS WE REALLY WANT (Penguin Books 2006). 
17 Generally, most buyers are simply required to provide a valid email 
address. The auction websites request a name and mailing address; however, 
anything can be added into the fields. No validation step is required. 
18 Amazon Participation Agreement, http://www.amazon.com/ 
exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/537790/104-4065965-9240735 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006); eBay User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006); Yahoo Terms of Service, 
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
19 Online Auction Sites and Trademark Infringement Liability, 58 THE 
RECORD 236, 240 (2003) (“[A]nticipating the threat of legal action by 
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complaints brought by intellectual property owners, take down 
listings from the auction sites, and cancel sellers’ accounts.20 
Other websites offer online forums where buyers can post 
complaints about fraudulent purchases.21 Despite these measures, 
auction sites rarely proactively scrutinize listings22 to ensure that 
counterfeit or infringing merchandise is not posted on the 
websites.23 
In response to the recent increase of counterfeit goods on 
online auctions,24 Tiffany, like other companies, takes 
aggressive steps to protect against the devaluation of its brand,25 
                                                          
trademark owners for secondary infringement, virtually all auction sites have 
crafted their legal terms in efforts to avoid such liability.”). 
20 Counterfeiters, however, are easily able to set up new accounts in 
order to display their counterfeit goods. On eBay, for example, the 
registration process is short. eBay merely requires its members to provide a 
valid credit card number and email address. Once a member is registered, he 
can list an item for auction, and eBay ensures that the item is available to be 
viewed and purchased by any other registered user for a maximum of ten 
days. For additional information, see eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2006). 
21 Yahoo! Auctions, http://www.auctions.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 
27, 2006). 
22 Some auction sites, including Bid4Assets and Property Room, are 
more pro-active about fraud prevention given their relationships with 
enforcement agencies. Ina Steiner, Fraud: What’s An Online Auction Site to 
Do?, AuctionBytes.com (Mar. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.auctionbytes.com/ cab/abn/y06/m03/i08/s04. The U.S. Marshals 
Service sells forfeited assets on Bid4Assets.com, and over 600 law 
enforcement agencies use PropertyRoom.com to auction “seized, stolen, lost 
and forfeited goods online.” Id. 
23 Online Auction Sites, supra note 19, at 238. 
24 In 2004, the Federal Trade Commission found that Internet auction 
fraud “accounted for the top category of consumer fraud complaints.” 
NISSANOFF, supra note 16, at 160. The number of complaints related to 
Internet auctions rose from “51,003 in 2002 to 98,653 in 2004.” Id. at 161. 
25 Some have argued that 
Counterfeiting affects the value of a brand, because when market 
demand is reduced for a particular brand due to the deception 
experienced by the consumer (i.e. the brand not delivering what is 
promised in quality or service), the market price of the asset 
declines. Likewise, greater costs are incurred in fighting the 
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including suing the auction houses for secondary liability and 
hiring outside consultants to help police the sites in search of 
counterfeit goods.26 Trademark owners themselves are in the 
best position to identify counterfeit products, particularly given 
the quality of counterfeit items27 in the marketplace, because 
they are, and should be, more knowledgeable about the brand 
than a particular online auction house. Trademark owners must 
create strong brand management plans that align with their 
corporate entity, while simultaneously incorporating and relying 
on partners and intermediaries, such as online auction houses, to 
help build their branding strategies.28 
This note will address the myriad solutions that trademark 
owners use to combat counterfeiting on the Internet and will 
argue that holding online auction houses secondarily liable is the 
wrong solution. Section I will highlight the most popular online 
auction houses and their efforts to prevent the sale of counterfeit 
goods and the commission of fraudulent transactions. Section II 
will then provide an overview of secondary liability, discuss 
prior unsuccessful litigation brought by intellectual property 
owners against online auction houses, and explain why litigation 
is the weakest solution to this problem. Section III will analyze 
potential legislative solutions to help monitor counterfeit online 
activity. Section IV will outline creative ways intellectual 
property owners can protect their brand identity. Ultimately, this 
note will show that intellectual property owners must develop a 
                                                          
counterfeiters, and lower income results from losing sales and 
market share to them as well. 
DAVID M. HOPKINS, ET AL., COUNTERFEITING EXPOSED: HOW TO PROTECT 
YOUR BRAND AND MARKET SHARE 26 (2003). 
26 See infra Section IV. 
27 See Geoffrey Colvin, From Knockoff Bags to Knockout Brands, 
FORTUNE, June 27, 2005, at 52 (stating that the high quality of the counterfeit 
goods is surprisingly unexpected and that a counterfeit company produces 
high-quality goods “worthy of being marketed under its own name, which 
could presumably be built into a valuable brand,” yet the companies chose to 
steal someone else’s name). 
28 “Partner roles have expanded to the extent that a customer’s exposure 
to a brand is entirely outside the brand owner’s direct control, from the point 
of brand awareness through fulfillment.” MURRAY, supra note 3, at 75. 
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solution that matches their corporate strategy. Building strong 
relationships and communicating with online auction sites will 
strengthen a corporation’s brand management plan and reduce 
the existence of counterfeit goods sold in cyberspace. 
I.  POPULAR ONLINE AUCTION HOUSES 
This section will highlight the most popular online auction 
houses and then analyze the ways in which they seek to regulate 
and police the sale of counterfeit goods. After addressing the 
programs built by the most well-known sites of eBay, Amazon, 
Yahoo!, uBid, and Overstock, the section will conclude with a 
comparison of the different measures and a recommendation that 
all online auction houses implement detailed take-down 
procedures for trademark owners to remove counterfeit goods 
quickly and efficiently. 
 A.  eBay 
eBay29 markets itself as the world’s largest online 
marketplace for the sale of goods and services amongst its 
registered users.30 With over 212 million registered users in 
                                                          
29 eBay, User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). The Agreement states: 
You will not hold eBay responsible for other users’ actions or 
inactions, including things they post. You acknowledge that we 
are not a traditional auctioneer. Instead, the Sites are a venue to 
allow anyone to offer, sell, and buy just about anything, at 
anytime, from anywhere, in a variety of pricing formats and 
venues, such as stores, fixed price formats and auction-style 
formats. We are not involved in the actual transaction between 
buyers and sellers. We have no control over and do not 
guarantee the quality, safety or legality of items advertised, the 
truth or accuracy of listings, the ability of sellers to sell items, 
the ability of buyers to pay for items, or that a buyer or seller 
will actually complete a transaction.  
Id. 
30 eBay, About eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay.html (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2006). The eBay community includes more than 200 million 
FAVRE 3/4/2007  12:05 AM 
172 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
2006, a 26% increase from the previous year, and net revenues 
totaling over $1.5 billion,31 eBay has quickly become one of the 
largest online venues for the sale of counterfeit goods.32 In 
response to growing concern over counterfeit goods on the site, 
eBay established the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) program, 
allowing intellectual property owners to register and then gain 
the right to close down auctions.33 An auction can be closed 
down immediately based on the rightful trademark owner’s good 
faith belief that the item is a fake.34 Additionally, the VeRO 
program includes access to a customer support group dedicated 
to servicing VeRO participants, dedicated priority email queues 
for reporting alleged infringing activities, and the ability to 
conduct automatic searches for potentially infringing items.35 
eBay’s VeRO program36 is one of the most robust of the 
online auctions;37 however, the technology partnered with the 
more than 1,000 employees charged with stopping illegal 
website sales is dwarfed by the 60 million items.38 
                                                          
registered members all over the world. Id. 
31 Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. Announces Third Quarter 2006 
Financial Results (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://investor.ebay.com/ 
releases.cfm. 
32 Katie Hafner, Seeing Fakes, Angry Traders Confront eBay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006 (discussing how “eBay, the biggest online marketplace, 
is the center of a new universe of counterfeit”). 
33 Additional information about the VeRO program can be found online. 
eBay, Reporting Intellectual Property Infringements,  http://pages.ebay.com/ 
help/tp/programs-vero-ov.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2006). 
34 Id. A seller who believes that his auction has been wrongfully 
removed may contact the auction site and dispute the decision. Id. 
35 Id. 
36 For an overview of the VeRO program and its faults, see Mary M. 
Calkins, My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than Me: The Failure of 
eBay’s Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Fraud, 7 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 33 (2001). 
37 “Fortunately, eBay has a very good system. It took many years to get 
there, by threatening to sue them under the doctrines of contributory and 
vicarious infringement. . . . But that is only one tiny piece of the picture.” 
Symposium, Panel III: The New Campaign Against Counterfeiting and 
Piracy, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 955, 973 (2004). 
38 Hafner, supra note 32.  
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B.  Amazon Marketplace and Amazon Auctions 
Amazon.com, Inc., operator of Amazon Marketplace and 
Amazon Auctions,39 began as an online bookstore in 1994 and 
has since established itself as an intricate online commerce 
company.40 Amazon launched its own Web auction service in 
March 1999 that laid the groundwork for the November 2000 
launch41 of Amazon Marketplace,42 a fixed-price online 
marketplace that allows consumers to sell used books, CDs, 
DVDs, and other products alongside new items. 
In its public documents, Amazon notes that they are not the 
“sellers of record in these third-party seller transactions.”43 
Amazon’s Prohibited Content Guide44 informs sellers that they 
are expected to ensure that all postings are not in violation of 
any laws. The procedures contain the following language 
regarding replicas of trademarked items: “the sale of 
                                                          
39 Amazon Auctions, http://www.auctions.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 
27, 2006). 
40 See Selling at Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ 
customer/display.html?nodeId=1161232 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). zShops, 
a fixed-price marketplace business launched by Amazon in December 1999 
was consolidated into Amazon Marketplace as of October 24, 2006. See 
Amazon Seller Community, http://www.amazonsellercommunity.com/ 
forums/thread.jspa?threadID=122979 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
41 Press Release, Amazon.com, Amazon Marketplace a Winner for 
Customers, Sellers and Industry (Mar. 19, 2001), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=159444&highlight=. 
42 In its 2006 Annual Report, Amazon notes that Amazon Marketplace 
enables “third-parties to sell their products on our websites, allows customers 
to shop for products owned by third parties using our features and 
technologies, and allows individuals to complete transactions that include 
multiple sellers in a single checkout process.” Amazon.com, Inc., Annual 




44 Amazon.com, Amazon Prohibited Content Guide, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/ help/customer/display.html?nodeId=537780#dp-
prohibited (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
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unauthorized replicas, pirated, counterfeit, and knockoff 
merchandise is not permitted. For instance, replicas of Rolex 
watches may not be posted on Amazon.com.”45 Although 
Amazon does reserve the right to remove any listing with 
inappropriate content,46 it offers no mechanism by which 
trademark owners can report potential violations. While 
Amazon’s transaction feedback system does provide some 
protection to consumers, it does not provide sufficient security 
to trademark owners regarding the removal of counterfeit goods. 
C.  Yahoo! Auctions 
Yahoo!, Inc. is an Internet portal that offers a full range of 
products and services, including a search engine, web-based 
email, online shopping, and online auction facilities.47 In 
contrast to eBay and Amazon, Yahoo! Inc. has taken a different 
approach to the issue of counterfeit and infringing items on its 
website. Yahoo!, operator of Yahoo! Auctions,48 developed a 
Neighborhood Watch Program that allows users to review and 
report potentially fraudulent auctions.49 Yahoo! Auctions relies 
on direct feedback from users. If an auction seller becomes the 
subject of Neighborhood Watch reports, he is given the 
opportunity to review the auction and then make appropriate 
changes or close the auction.50 If continued problems persist, 
Yahoo! Customer Care is notified, and an associate reviews the 
auction and takes the appropriate action as outlined in the Terms 
of Service.51 Also, in order to submit a multi-quantity auction, a 
seller must fall into one of two categories: he must have a rating 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 For a history of Yahoo!, see http://docs.yahoo.com/info/ 
misc/history.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
48 Yahoo! Auctions, http://www.auctions.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 
27, 2006). 
49 Yahoo! Neighborhood Watch Program, http://auctions.yahoo.com/ 
phtml/auc/us/promo/safe.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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of at least ten and be a Yahoo! Auctions user for at least sixty 
days or he must have a verified address with Yahoo PayDirect 
from HSBC.52 Such procedures will help reduce the existence of 
large-volume counterfeiters. While Yahoo! Auctions53 does not 
have a formal infrastructure in place specifically for trademark 
owners to report abuse,54 it has created policies to limit the 
existence of fraudulent actions. 
D.  uBid 
uBid55 is an online auction marketplace that connects 
consumers with pre-screened, certified sellers supplying new, 
close-out, overstock, and refurbished consumer goods. Founded 
in 1997, uBid re-entered the market in 2005 claiming to be “The 
Marketplace you can Trust”56 due to the secure nature of the 
transactions compared to other Internet auctions. The site offers 
both products sold through uBid and products offered by other 
established businesses through the uBid Certified Merchant 
Program.57 The Program requires participants to show they are 
authorized dealers before selling certain brands.58 In order to 
prove their products are not counterfeit and accurately depicted, 
                                                          
52 Id. For additional information, see Press Release, HSBC and Yahoo! 
Enter Strategic Agreement to Allow Worldwide Person-to-Person Payments 
(July 30, 2001), available at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release797.html. 
53 Yahoo! Auctions also use automatic “bots,” a technology that scans 
the website for words and phrases that might indicate prohibited items. Online 
Auction Sites, supra note 19, at 239. 
54 Yahoo! Auctions does have an online feedback form where a Yahoo! 
user may report activity that abuses the Auctions service. Yahoo! Auctions 
Feedback Form, http://add.yahoo.com/fast/help/us/auct/cgi_abuse (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2006). 
55 uBid Company Overview, http://ubid.com/about/companyinfo.asp (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2006). According to the website, uBid has 5 million 
registered users and has sold over $1 billion dollars in merchandise since it 
started in 1997. Id. 
56 uBid Promise of Trust, http://ubid.com/about/trust.asp (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2006). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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they must go through a rigorous approval process that includes 
credit checks, trade references and numerous other 
requirements.59 In addition to establishing seller requirements, 
uBid also monitors its website by “randomly purchasing 
products and verifying their authenticity.”60 Although the 
volume of 5 million users is more manageable than the 212 
million registered users of eBay,61 uBid created a system with a 
foundation in fraud protection that provides a strong model for 
protecting trademark owners against counterfeiting. 
E. Overstock Auctions 
Overstock.com is an Internet company whose relationship 
with large brand owners allows it to sell over-produced products 
and cancelled orders at discounted prices.62 In 2004, Overstock 
launched an auction site63 with a focus on fraud prevention. The 
company focuses on consumer education, including the words 
“How to Spot a Scam” in every listing item page.64 Similar to 
uBid, Overstock Auctions created a Trusted Merchant Program 
that limits search results to mainstream merchants such as 
Olympus and Sharper Image.65 Overstock Auctions also 
                                                          
59 Id. 
60 Steiner, supra note 22, at 2. 
61 Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. Announces Third Quarter 2006 
Financial Results (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://investor.ebay.com/ 
releases.cfm. 
62 Overstock.com, About Us, http://www.overstock.com/cgi-bin/ 
d2.cgi?SEC_IID=20356&PAGE=staticpage&page_id=5&TRACK=FOOT_
OI_L3#Pricing (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
63 Overstock Auctions, http://auctions.overstock.com (last visited Nov. 
27, 2006). 
64 The Q&A on “How to Spot a Scam” includes red flags to protect 
consumers. Overstock Auctions, FAQ “How can I protect myself from 
fraud? How do I spot a scam?” http://auctions.overstock.com/cgi-bin/ 
auctions.cgi?PAGE=FAQ&MODE=ANSW&ID=61 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006). 
65 Overstock Auction Trusted Merchant Program, 
http://auctions.overstock.com/cgi-bin/auctions.cgi?PAGE=static&pagenum=
106532#trusted (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). The program is provided by 
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introduced a social networking feature, allowing buyers and 
sellers to rate transactions, and a Content Reporting system for 
customers and businesses to report violations.66 Although the 
audience for the system is not specifically trademark owners, 
like eBay’s VeRO program, Overstock Auction does provide an 
outlet where counterfeit goods may be reported. 
While Amazon Marketplace, Yahoo! Auctions, uBid, and 
Overstock Auctions each employ important and distinct measures 
to protect consumers, the process for intellectual property 
owners to monitor their brands remains inadequate. Using a 
trademark-owner-focused program like eBay’s as a baseline, all 
online auctions and marketplaces should implement formal 
takedown procedures by which verified rights owners can report 
suspicious behavior and request quick removal of allegedly 
infringing auction listings. These changes would reduce lawsuits 
brought by intellectual property owners and create new forums 
through which auction sites and intellectual property owners 
could create more efficient programs to reduce the sale of 
counterfeit goods. 
II.  POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ONLINE AUCTION 
HOUSES 
Although recent case law and legislative acts, such as the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,67 have provided some clarity 
on the issue of copyright infringement in Internet commerce, the 
state of trademark law over the Internet remains somewhat 
                                                          
BuySafe, a service that bonds online seller transactions, guaranteeing 
purchases up to $25,000. Id. 
66 For information on Overstock’s Trusted Overstock Auction Sellers 
Affiliate, see Trusted Overstock Auction Sellers Affiliate, 
http://auctions.overstock.com/cgi-bin/auctions.cgi?PAGE=static&pagenum=
852 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
67 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
simultaneously provides “strong incentives for service providers and 
copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements 
that take place in the digital network environment” and advances guidance to 
ISPs on their direct, contributory and vicarious liability for the infringing 
actions of others. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998). 
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ambiguous.68 In recent years, trademark owners have attempted 
to bring suit against online marketplaces under the Lanham Act69 
for secondary trademark infringement.70 While no U.S. courts 
have directly addressed potential trademark liability of online 
auction houses, it is likely that courts will look to prior litigation 
against those sites involving claims of copyright infringement.71 
This section will provide an overview of secondary liability 
under both trademark and copyright law and will then address 
prior and active litigation against online auction houses. Finally, 
                                                          
68 See Matthew Fornaro, A Parallel Problem: Grey Market Goods and 
the Internet, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 69, 71 (2003) (stating that trademark law 
has “labored to keep pace with the proliferation of technology. Although 
recent case law and legislative acts such as the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) have addressed these issues as they apply to copyright law, 
current law does not adequately protect trademark owners, especially in light 
of increasing Internet-based commerce.”). 
69 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The Lanham Act defines the scope of a 
trademark, the process by which a federal trademark registration can be 
obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and penalties for 
trademark infringement. Id. The Lanham Act prevents consumer confusion, 
protects the goodwill of businesses, and promotes competition. See Windsor, 
Inc. v. Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1520 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) citing Scarves By Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports, Ltd. 544 F.2d 1167, 
1172 (2d Cir. 1976). 
70 Online buyers have also tried unsuccessfully to bring suit under unfair 
competition laws. In Lars Gentry v. eBay, Inc., online buyers of forged 
autographed sports paraphernalia sued eBay for negligence and unfair 
business practices under California state law. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002). The court affirmed that eBay had immunity under the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.S. § 230, as an interactive 
computer service provider. Id. Section 230 provides a federal immunity to 
any cause of action that would make interactive service providers liable for 
information originating with a third party user of the service. Id. The court 
also noted that eBay had no responsibility to authenticate the items in 
question, since eBay was not the party physically responsible for selling the 
items. Id. at 711. 
71 See generally, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 
(2005); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); ALS 
Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Communications, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Earth 
Flag, Ltd. v. Alamo Flag Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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it will argue why holding online auction houses liable for 
secondary trademark infringement will ultimately do damage to 
consumers, without providing relief to trademark owners 
combating devalued brands due to counterfeiting. 
A. Contributory and Vicarious Trademark Infringement 
To date, no court decisions have held auction websites or 
global marketplaces directly liable for providing services,72 
however limited or automated in nature, to sellers of counterfeit 
goods.73 In search of a remedy, many intellectual property 
owners turned to the theory of secondary liability: contributory 
and vicarious infringement.74 This section analyses those 
theories and addresses how the actions of online auction houses 
could lead to liability. 
1.  Contributory Trademark Infringement 
The doctrine of contributory infringement originates in tort 
law and suggests that one who directly contributes to another’s 
infringement should be held accountable.75 A contributory 
                                                          
72 To make out a claim for direct trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish that (1) its mark is protectable and (2) 
the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among 
consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). 
73 See Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame on Cyberspace: Towards a 
Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark, and Tort 
Liability for Conduct Occurring over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 729, 762 (1999). “Because so much of what happens online is 
automatic–based on operating software and established protocols—direct 
copyright and trademark liability should not be imposed on an access or 
content provider unless there is some element of volition or causation 
present.” Id. 
74 A party that does not directly infringe on another’s mark may be 
found secondarily liable for the infringement, under either a contributory or 
vicarious theory of liability. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession 
Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). 
75 MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 222 
(LexisNexis 2005). 
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infringer is “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, 
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct of another.”76 The standard for contributory trademark 
infringement originates in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives 
Laboratories, Inc., where the Supreme Court considered 
whether the manufacturer of a generic drug could be secondarily 
liable for the direct infringement of pharmacists.77 The Court 
held that a manufacturer or a distributor could be held 
contributorily liable for the direct infringing actions of others if 
it: “(1) intentionally induces a third party to infringe a 
trademark or (2) continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement.”78 Liability requires proof of direct infringement 
by a third party, as well as the defendant’s intent and knowledge 
of the wrongful activities.79 Once courts applied the Inwood test 
to other third parties including landlords80 and flea market 
operators,81 trademark owners began to aggressively police their 
marks. 
Courts found difficulty applying the existing tests for 
contributory trademark liability to situations arising over the 
Internet, as web-based business models are neither based on a 
                                                          
76 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
77 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
78 Id. at 854. Accord Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 64 
(2d Cir. 1992); Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. 
Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
79 David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int’l Trading Co., Inc., 884 F.2d 306, 
311 (7th Cir. 1989). 
80 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 
F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a flea market operator could 
fall under this rule like a manufacturer or distributor when vendors at the 
markets sold t-shirts with counterfeited Hard Rock logos. Ultimately, the 
vendor was not liable because his acts were negligent and not willfully 
blind.). 
81 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the operator of a swap meet could be contributorily liable 
for its independent vendors’ sales of infringing goods because it was 
“supplying the necessary marketplace for their sale”). 
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distributor/manufacturer nor a landlord/tenant relationship.82 In 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed that a domain name registrar could not be liable 
simply because it registered, and refused to cancel, domain 
names that contained a registered mark.83 Two years later, in 
Gucci America, Inc., v. Hall & Associates, a New York District 
Court found Mindspring, an ISP, akin to a flea market operator 
because it provided the “actual storage and communication for 
infringing material.”84 The District Court ruled that the ISP 
could prevent the infringing conduct by monitoring sites using 
its services or terminating service to wrongful parties accused of 
selling counterfeits.85 In Government Employees Insurance Co., 
v. Google, Inc, a 2004 District Court in Virginia found that the 
Google search engine could be held liable under a theory of 
contributory infringement for the actions of banner advertisers if 
the plaintiff showed that the defendant monitored and controlled 
the third-party advertisements.86 Although courts have explored 
the question of contributory trademark liability in the Internet 
context,87 a clear standard has not been established. 
                                                          
82 Some argue that in an effort to extend the test to the Internet, many 
courts have “significantly and inappropriately altered the underlying 
standard.” Jason Kessler, Correcting the Standard for Contributory 
Trademark Liability over the Internet, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 
386 (2006). Kessler further argues that in lieu of “considering only 
knowledge of infringement as a factor, many courts have considered the 
extent of control or monitoring by a defendant over the means of 
infringement. Even if such an extension is a positive outcome, these courts 
have altered the test without purporting to have changed it at all.” Id. 
83 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 
986 (9th Cir. 1999). 
84 Gucci America, Inc., v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
85 Id. 
86 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 
(E.D. Va. 2004). 
 87 Congress has also limited the liability of ISPs for libelous statements 
published by third parties using the ISP's service. See, e.g., Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
imposition of liability on ISPs for publishing third-party libel would "create 
an impossible burden in the Internet context" that would deter ISPs from 
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2.  Vicarious Trademark Infringement 
In contrast, the theory of vicarious trademark liability 
“requires a finding that the defendant and the infringer have an 
apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one 
another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint 
ownership or control over the infringing product.”88 In 
determining liability, courts consider the extent of control 
exercised by a defendant over a third-party’s means of 
infringement.89 “Direct control and monitoring of the 
instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s 
mark” can lead to liability.90 
In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, 
Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that a flea market owner could not 
be vicariously liable under trademark law for infringing acts by 
vendors who rented space in the market, noting that the owner 
did not hire the vendors, take a portion of the vendors’ sales, or 
exercise control over the vendors beyond that exercised by a 
landlord over its tenants.91 Some argue that vicarious liability 
only occurs when the parties’ paths “cross on a daily basis, and 
the character of this intersection must be such that the party 
against whom liability is sought is in a position to control the 
personnel and activities responsible for the direct 
infringement.”92 Perhaps it is the stringency of the common law 
                                                          
engaging in self-regulation, and holding that Congress passed the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, to ensure that ISPs 
would not face publisher liability for third-party libel). 
88 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 
F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992). 
89 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
90 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 
984 (9th Cir. 1999). 
91 Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149. 
92 Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1109-111 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (finding Express's parent company not vicariously liable for 
infringement because "the day-to-day decisions of Express are made by 
Express employees only"). See also David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int’l Trading 
Co., 884 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding defendants not liable 
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standard–requiring a partnership, joint ownership/control, or 
employment relationship–which makes the establishment of 
vicarious liability for trademark infringement rare. 
While under current secondary trademark law, trademark 
owners could find success in holding online auctions—depending 
on functionality—liable, it would not result in a reduction of 
counterfeit goods. To better understand how future courts might 
apply secondary trademark liability, it is appropriate to briefly 
review secondary liability under copyright law. 
B.  Comparison: Tests for Contributory and Vicarious 
Copyright Infringement 
In assessing infringement liability, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “secondary liability for trademark infringement 
should, in any event, be more narrowly drawn than secondary 
liability for copyright infringement.”93 This section will 
highlight the key differences between copyright and trademark 
law, and will then address the current state of copyright law 
related to secondary liability. It will conclude by assessing how 
these concepts can be extrapolated to cover potential liability of 
online auction houses.94 
Although the concepts of copyright and trademark fall under 
the umbrella of intellectual property, the laws differ in whom 
they seek to protect and the overall public policy goals they 
hope to achieve. Copyright law applies to a broad range of 
works and exists to promote the wide dissemination of 
                                                          
because of lack of evidence that they had ‘‘any type of partnership 
agreement, that they held themselves out to the public or operated as a 
partnership, that either had authority to bind the other in any transaction with 
any third party, or that they exercised joint ownership of, or control over, the 
(allegedly infringing products) after they were sold.”). 
93 Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1150 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984)). 
94 In Sony, the Supreme Court noted that the standard used in Inwood, 
which imposed liability on a manufacturer who suggested, even by 
implication, that a retailer used the manufacturer’s goods to infringe the 
trademark of another, was “equally appropriate in the copyright context.” 
464 U.S. at 489.  
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information.95 Copyright protection is predominantly in place to 
protect the author and provide an incentive for him to share his 
work, ultimately benefiting the public.96 In contrast, trademarks 
exist mainly to benefit consumers by preventing confusion and 
reducing consumer search costs.97 The rights of copyright 
owners are created the moment the idea is expressed in a 
tangible medium,98 and are limited to the life of the author plus 
seventy years.99 Trademark holders, however, must continue to 
use their trademarks in commerce in order to maintain their 
rights.100 Various tests have been created for both contributory 
and vicarious liability and will be discussed below.101 
1.  Contributory Copyright Infringement 
The Copyright Act102 does not specifically address secondary 
liability; however, the Supreme Court noted that the lack of 
explicit reference does not exclude the imposition of liability on 
                                                          
95 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 and 17 U.S.C. § 103. 
96 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 18 
(LexisNexis 2005). 
97 Id. at 18. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
Preservation of the trademark as a means of identifying the 
trademark owner’s products . . . . makes effective competition 
possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a 
means through which the consumer can identify products which 
please him and reward the producer with continued patronage. 
Without some such method of product identification, informed 
consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, 
could not exist. 
Id. at 566. 
98 LEAFFER, supra note 96, at 49. 
99 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). 
100 LEAFFER, supra note 96, at 36. 
101 Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not exist without 
direct infringement by a third party. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2. To make out a claim for direct copyright infringement, 
a plaintiff must establish (1) that it owns a copyright for the allegedly 
infringed work and (2) that the alleged infringers violated at least one 
exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). Id. 
102 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
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third parties.103 In order to prove liability for contributory 
infringement, there must be: (1) an act of direct infringement by 
someone other than the secondary party, and the secondary party 
must (2) have knowledge of the infringing activity, and (3) 
induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringement.104 
The knowledge element may be satisfied by either actual or 
constructive knowledge.105 In Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc, the Supreme Court found that a manufacturer of 
VCRs, suitable for substantial non-infringing uses, was not 
liable as a contributory infringer since the product was a “stable 
item of commerce” and the manufacturer had not encouraged the 
infringing use.106 The 1984 Sony case was the first Supreme 
Court decision to apply secondary liability for copyright 
infringement and continues to be one of the principal 
authorities.107 
In a later online music file-sharing case, MGM Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd.,108 the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of 
proper interpretation of knowledge in Sony, finding that the 
standard in Sony is inapplicable where there is evidence that the 
                                                          
103 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 435 (1984). Some argue, however, that the legislature intended the 
language “to authorize” to avoid any questions regarding the liability of 
contributory infringers. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT 
LAW 426 (LexisNexis 2005). 
104 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417. 
105 Id. at 439. See also Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that liability 
for contributory infringement can arise when the secondary party had 
“knowledge, or reason to know” of the direct infringement). 
106 Sony, 443 F.2d at 426. 
107 Elizabeth Miles, In Re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-
to-Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21 (2004). 
108 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). The 
court found the music file-sharing system in Grokster differed from Napster 
in two substantial ways: (1) it was a general file-sharing program, with more 
significant non-infringing uses than Napster; and (2) it did not use a central 
server, stopping the software distributor from the ability to control the user’s 
actions. Id. at 2769 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (exemplifying that the 
Supreme Court remains deeply divided over the proper interpretation of 
Sony’s “capable of substantial non-infringing use” standard). 
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defendant distributed a device “with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright.”109 The standard set forth in Grokster 
shifts the focus away from the qualities of the product or device 
itself to the intent110 of the distributing party.111 In Grokster, the 
court dealt with a claim where there was actual intent and 
affirmative steps taken to encourage copyright infringement.112 It 
is unlikely that the Grokster test would be used in cases against 
eBay and other online auction houses, as the sites have no actual 
intent to induce infringing activity and take affirmative steps to 
discourage infringement. 
2.  Vicarious Copyright Infringement 
The related concept of vicarious copyright liability has been 
established by case law, and developed under the theory of 
                                                          
109 Id. at 2770, 2779. The Supreme Court set out an alternative 
inducement theory analysis to determine the existence of contributory 
copyright liability. Id. Under the new test, a company is liable for 
contributory infringement if (1) they intend to bring about the infringement, 
(2) by distributing a device suitable for infringing use, and (3) actual 
infringement occurred. Id. at 2782. The Court reconciled the new rule with 
the staple article of commerce doctrine from Sony by stating that Sony dealt 
with the more narrow issue of whether there is a claim “of liability based 
solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful uses, 
with knowledge that some users would follow the unlawful course.” Id. 
110 Id. at 2781, n.12. The court in Grokster sets forth three categories of 
evidence that can be used to demonstrate a defendant’s intent. Id. at 2782. 
One of the categories is the failure to take any affirmative steps to prevent 
infringing use, such as attempting to develop filtering tools. Id. This perhaps 
suggests a duty to attempt to minimize infringement. 
111 Laura E. Hancock, Contributory and Vicarious Copyright 
Infringement as Applied to Auctions, Flea Markets, and Swap Meets: How 
Fonovisa and Napster Have Set the Standard, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 
295, 318-19 (2005). 
112 Grokster specifically targeted Napster users by inserting “digital 
codes into its Web site so that computer users using Web search engines to 
look for ‘Napster’ or ‘[f]ree filesharing’ would be directed to the Grokster 
Web site, where they could download the Grokster software.” Grokster, 125 
S. Ct. at 2773. 
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respondeat superior.113 Vicarious liability occurs where a 
“supervisory party bears for the actionable conduct of a 
subordinate or associate based on the relationship between the 
parties.”114 Courts fashioned a principle to create liability for an 
indirect infringer whose economic interests are intertwined with 
the direct infringers, even without a traditional employer-
employee relationship.115 A party is vicariously liable for 
copyright infringement if it (1) can supervise or control the 
premises under which infringing material is sold and (2) obtains 
a direct financial benefit from the infringing activities.116 When 
determining if vicarious copyright infringement exists, courts 
look to see if the defendant had the “right and ability to 
supervise the infringing activity,” leveraging decisions in 
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.117 and A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.118 
In the 1996 Fonovisa decision, the Ninth Circuit held that 
flea market organizers had the right and ability to control the 
sale of counterfeit items because they could terminate vendors 
for any reason, control the access of customers to the booth 
area, control direct infringers through its rules and regulations, 
                                                          
113 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
114 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004). 
115 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding that even in the absence of 
“an employer-employee relationship, one may be vicariously liable if he has 
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct 
financial interest in such activities.”). 
116 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (holding that a department store was 
vicariously liable for an independent concessionaire’s sale of counterfeit 
recordings on store premises). In the Ninth Circuit, the mere potential to 
influence is inadequate to satisfy the control requirement. See Frank Music 
Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990). "[A] parent corporation cannot be held liable 
for the infringing actions of its subsidiary unless there is a substantial and 
continuing connection between the two with respect to the infringing acts." 
Id. at 1553. 
117 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259. 
118 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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and promote the show.119 In 2001, the Ninth Circuit in Napster 
built upon Fonovisa and identified similar aspects of influence 
and control, holding that (1) Napster had the right and ability to 
supervise its users’ conduct; (2) the users were required to 
register with Napster in order to access the file-sharing system; 
(3) Napster possessed and exercised the power to terminate 
access to users; and (4) Napster had the “ability to block 
infringers’ access to a particular environment for any reason 
whatsoever.” The court found that Napster could be vicariously 
liable when it failed to “affirmatively use its ability to patrol its 
system and preclude access to potentially infringing” users.120 
Vicarious liability, like direct infringement, does not require a 
showing of knowledge or intent.121 
Despite the inherent differences between copyright and 
trademark law, courts are likely to look to copyright law in 
determining the existence of secondary trademark liability. It 
will be a difficult endeavor as the Supreme Court in Sony 
recognized that the “lines between direct infringement, 
contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly 
drawn.”122 
C.  Hendrickson v. eBay: A Victory for eBay regarding 
Copyright and Trademark Liability 
In Hendrickson v. eBay,123 eBay won a victory under 
copyright theory that could impact secondary liability under 
trademark law.124 The case evaluated whether § 512(c) of the 
                                                          
119 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262. 
120 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027. Napster had “both the ability to use its 
search function to identify infringing musical recordings and the right to bar 
participation of users who engage in the transmission of infringing files.” Id. 
121 The Napster court noted that Sony’s “staple article of commerce” 
analysis has no application to Napster’s potential liability for vicarious 
copyright infringement. Id. at 1020. 
122  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 435 n.17 (1984).  
123 Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. Cal. 2001). 
124 Id. 
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safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”)125 afforded protection to the online auction house 
when the copyright owner sought to hold the company 
secondarily liable for copyright infringement.126 The matter was 
one of first impression in the federal courts.127 
The plaintiff, Robert Hendrickson, sued eBay for copyright 
infringement claiming that unauthorized copies of his 
documentary film about Charles Manson were being sold on 
eBay.128 Prior to filing suit, Hendrickson sent a cease and desist 
letter to eBay complaining of the infringement; however, the 
letter failed to specify sufficient details of the infringing auction 
to satisfy the statutory guidelines of a takedown notice.129 The 
District Court held that the safe harbor notice provision in § 
512(c)130 of the DMCA protected eBay from secondary liability 
                                                          
125 The DMCA “is designed to facilitate the robust development and 
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, 
development, and education.” S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1 (1998). Title II of 
the DMCA, included in 17 U.S.C. § 512, “protects qualifying Internet 
service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious 
and contributory infringement.” Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
126 Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1086. 
129 Id. at 1084-85 (eBay requested that Hendrickson “identify the exact 
items which you believe infringe your rights. In addition, we would need a 
statement from you, under penalty of perjury, that you own (or are the agent 
of the owner) the copyrights in the documentary.”). 
130 Under the third prong, section (c), the service provider’s duty to act 
is triggered upon receipt of proper notice. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(3)(C) 
(1998). The notification must include “substantially” the following six 
elements: 
(i) a physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to 
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly 
infringed; (ii) identification of the copyrighted work claimed to 
have been infringed; (iii) identification of the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity and that it is to be removed or access to which is to be 
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the 
service provider to locate the material; (iv) information 
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact 
the complaining party; (v) a statement that the complaining party 
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for copyright infringement.131 The Court noted that just because 
a service provider has the ability to remove or block access to 
materials posted on its website, it does not follow that it has the 
right and ability to control the infringing activity.132 Both the 
legislative history of the DMCA and the court in Hendrickson 
focused on Congress’s lack of intent to penalize a service 
provider for engaging in voluntary monitoring efforts, such as 
eBay’s VeRO program.133 
The facts in Hendrickson worked strongly in eBay’s favor 
because the plaintiff’s efforts to notify eBay of the infringement 
were minimal and lacked sufficient detail.134 If a vicarious 
trademark infringement case was brought against an online 
auction house using Hendrickson, it is likely that the auction 
house would prevail.135 The court held that eBay’s voluntary 
monitoring using the VeRO program was insufficient to 
constitute a right and ability to control the infringing activity 
under the DMCA.136 The court also noted that if the Lanham 
Act137 claim from one of the consolidated cases had moved 
forward, then eBay would be an innocent infringer138 since the 
                                                          
has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent or the law; and (vi) a statement that the information in the 
notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the 
complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright 
owner. 
Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.  
131 Id. at 1092.  
132 Id. 
133 Id. See also Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914   
(D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the imposition on a service provider of a 
continuing duty to monitor its site for infringing activity was contrary to the 
intent of Congress in enacting § 512 of the DMCA). 
134 Trademark owners who are considering suit against online auction 
houses could easily distinguish this case on its facts. Online Auction Sites, 
supra note 19, at 253. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 253-54. 
137 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). 
138 The Lanham Act provides for an innocent infringer defense where: 
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facts showed that eBay had no knowledge of a potential violation 
prior to suit.139 The innocent infringer ruling was based on the 
Court’s determination that eBay had “no affirmative duty to 
monitor its own website” violations.140 The Hendrickson case 
exemplifies the “dark prospects of a judicial victory for 
trademark holders against such alleged violations.”141 
D.  The Effect of Active and Future Trademark Litigation 
Against Online Auction Houses 
The ambiguity of the law regarding secondary trademark 
liability of online auction sites could soon be resolved. There are 
currently both national and international suits pending against 
online auction houses. Tiffany filed suit against eBay in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York accusing 
the online company of direct and contributory trademark 
infringement for the “facilitation and participation in the 
counterfeiting, infringement and false advertising of the federally 
registered trademarks owned, licensed and/or used by 
Tiffany.”142 
                                                          
the infringement or violation complained of is contained in or is 
part of paid advertising matter in a newspaper, magazine, or 
other similar periodical or in an electronic communication as 
defined in section 2510(12) of Title 18, the remedies of the 
owner of the right infringed or person bringing the action under 
section 1125(a) of this title as against the publisher or distributor 
of such newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical or 
electronic communication shall be limited to an injunction 
against the presentation of such advertising matter in future 
issues of such newspapers, magazines, or other similar 
periodicals or in future transmissions of such electronic 
communications. The limitations of this subparagraph shall apply 
only to innocent infringers and innocent violators.  
15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
139 Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1095 (D. Cal. 2001). 
140 Id. at 1096. 
141 Matthew Fornaro, A Parallel Problem: Grey Market Goods and the 
Internet, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 69, 86 (2003). 
142 First Amended Complaint, Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 2004 WL 
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According to the company, Tiffany tried to leverage eBay’s 
VeRO system to manage its problems with counterfeit items.143 
Tiffany hired two full-time employees to work with eBay over 
the course of five months, removing over 19,000 auctions that 
were selling counterfeit Tiffany merchandise.144 In early 2004, 
Tiffany implemented a program to purchase at random through 
eBay auctions jewelry bearing its brand name and found that 
73% were not genuine merchandise.145 Tiffany brought the 
lawsuit and argued that “eBay has facilitated the promotion and 
sale in the United States of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry by 
providing a forum for, and actually promoting, such sales.”146 
Tiffany argues that the main issue is “whether eBay is akin to an 
innocent landlord, or whether its direct and indirect support of 
counterfeiters on its auction sites, with knowledge of their 
activities and the means to stop it, makes it liable as well for 
such illegal activity.”147 
eBay arguably has a strong defense against Tiffany’s claim 
of contributory trademark infringement. The second prong of the 
modified Inwood148 test finds liability if the defendant continues 
to supply a product to one whom it knows or has reason to 
know is engaging in trademark infringement. It would be 
difficult to argue that eBay supplied or “controlled and 
monitored” the infringement since the sellers have independent 
control to create an account, select the duration of the auction 
and payment preferences, write the language describing the 
product, and post pictures of the item.149 eBay has the power to 
                                                          
1413904, para. 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (No. 04CV4607) [hereinafter 
Complaint.] 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at para. 37. 
145 Id. at para. 38. 
146 Id. at para. 21. 
147 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
to Amend Its Answer, Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 2005 WL 2582299 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005) (No. 04CV4607). 
148 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
149 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that Amazon.com had no right or ability to 
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shut down an auction; however, that power is usually only 
exerted upon the active request of buyers who question the 
authenticity or trademark owners who feel that the item is a 
counterfeit.150 
In this case, eBay had direct knowledge of infringements 
from Tiffany and promptly removed the infringing auctions.151 
eBay’s partnership and active involvement with Tiffany to 
remove counterfeit auctions strengthens the argument that eBay 
lacks the intent to create a forum for counterfeiters. With the 
Supreme Court’s recent focus on proactive monitoring as 
evidenced by the Grokster decision, it is likely that courts will 
begin to focus more on intermediaries’ intent, regardless of the 
type of intellectual property infringement. eBay’s VeRO 
program and ongoing interaction with trademark owners will 
likely limit the company’s liability under contributory 
infringement.152 If the case was brought against an online 
auction house with a poor reporting program for intellectual 
property owners, it would be more difficult to show that the 
website did not continue to facilitate the infringement and was 
not willfully blind.153 
                                                          
control products of third party vendors, as it never had them in its control). 
150 For additional information regarding eBay’s removal and reporting 
procedures, see eBay Reporting Intellectual Property Infringements (VeRO), 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006). 
151 Complaint, supra note 142. One could also argue that eBay had 
knowledge that the items were counterfeit since Tiffany publicizes that it is 
the only source for new authentic jewelry. Id. at paras. 10-11. However, 
under the first-sale doctrine, owners of authentic Tiffany jewelry are able to 
sell their items on eBay. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 
(1908) (first recognizing the first-sale doctrine). While eBay was aware of 
specific listings communicated by Tiffany up through the VeRO program, it 
would be impossible for eBay to have actual direct knowledge of all of the 
billions of listings on the site. 
152 For an in-depth analysis of the legal and policy arguments for and 
against Tiffany’s claim of contributory trademark infringement, see Fara S. 
Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites From the Contributory Trademark 
Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. 
Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909 (2005). 
153 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 
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Tiffany elected not to bring a suit against eBay for vicarious 
infringement.154 Although the Court in Hard Rock rejected the 
possibility that landlords might be vicariously liable for any 
direct infringement of their tenant,155 there have been no cases 
addressing such trademark liability in an Internet context. It 
could easily be argued that eBay received a monetary benefit 
from the infringement and that they were aware of the 
infringements through their relationship with Tiffany. It would 
be more difficult to determine that the auction website had 
sufficient control to influence the counterfeit activity. If the 
court in Tiffany & Co. followed the same rationale employed by 
the District Court in Henderson, it would find that eBay’s 
voluntary monitoring using the VeRO program was insufficient 
to constitute a right and ability to control the infringing 
activity.156 
In addition to the pending New York suit, eBay was recently 
sued by two major Paris fashion houses for allegedly selling 
counterfeit goods.157 LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton and 
its sister company, Christian Dior Couture, brought suit in 
France seeking fifty million in damages.158 Contending that 
                                                          
1996). 
154 Tiffany also did not bring suit for contributory liability for dilution. 
At the time of suit, only one district court case had actually recognized a 
cause of action for encouraging another to dilute a trademark. See, e.g., John 
T. Cross, Contributory and Vicarious Liability for Trademark Dilution, 80 
OR. L. REV. 625, 630 (2001). On March 8, 2006, the Senate passed an 
amended version of the House’s Proposed Amendment to the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act. 151 CONG. REC. § 1921-23 (Mar. 8, 2006). The 
Senate added facilitative language to address concerns from Internet service 
providers about secondary liability. 151 CONG. REC. § 1921-23. 
155  Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 
F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992). 
156 See eBay’s Liability is Cleared in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at 
C14 (discussing a San Diego court’s dismissal of a class action suit against 
the online auction house claiming that the company did not have a 
responsibility to ensure the authenticity of the items sold through its website). 
157 Carol Matlack, Fed Up With Fakes, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 9, 2006, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_41/ 
b4004060.htm. 
158 Id. 
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nearly all Vuitton and Dior items sold on the auction site are 
fakes, the companies purchased 150,000 Vuitton items and 
300,000 Dior products offered on eBay and determined that 
90% were counterfeits.159 While France’s anti-counterfeiting 
laws are tough, its courts are unlikely to award large 
damages.160 If eBay is found liable, the French court could 
decide that a France-only fix is insufficient and instead order 
eBay to remove the counterfeit items from its website 
worldwide.161 While the pending litigation against eBay both in 
France and New York could lead to disastrous results for 
Internet commerce, it would provide needed clarity on the law 
regarding secondary trademark liability. 
Tiffany and other multi-million dollar brands162 are 
combating a raging problem with counterfeiting and are 
exploring several outlets for liability. Instead of partnering to 
build a solution, some trademark owners have targeted the 
online action houses as one of those outlets.163 If online auction 
houses are found liable for secondary trademark infringement, it 
will ultimately do severe damage to consumers and small 
businesses that use the online auction houses in legal and 
legitimate ways.164 Liability would result in increased consumer 
search costs165 and reduced functionality of the websites. Making 
                                                          
159 Id. 
160 In France, one who is found owning a fake Vuitton handbag is 
punishable by a fine of twice the value of the genuine bag. Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Rolex identified 180 infringing auctions in 1998 and over 4,000 in 
2005. Microsoft shuts down an average of 40,000 auctions a year. 7 For All 
Mankind shuts down 10,000 individual sellers of counterfeit jeans per month. 
Dean Takahashi, Online Auction Counterfeit Spurs Companies to Fight Back, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 15, 2006). 
163 This ultimately results in trademark owners focusing their litigation 
efforts on third-party intermediaries instead of directly seeking out 
counterfeiters.  
164 eBay estimates that over 500,000 Americans earn at least a portion of 
their incomes by selling goods on eBay. See Meg and the Power of Many, 
THE ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at 65. 
165 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Symposium: Trademark in 
Transition: Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium: 
FAVRE 3/4/2007  12:05 AM 
196 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
online auctions houses liable would force them to stop selling 
new trademarked goods, thereby destroying their economic 
models. In many cases, companies can leverage online auction 
houses’ pre-existing communication vehicles, such as eBay’s 
VeRO program, to adequately remedy counterfeiting issues. 
Large companies with famous brands have successfully 
partnered with online auction houses to fight counterfeiting. For 
example, the Callaway Golf Company,166 a producer of high-end 
golf equipment, worked with eBay to bring criminal charges 
against a suspect who was selling counterfeit clubs on the 
auction site.167 After eBay removed the suspect listing, Callaway 
received the seller’s contact information and filed suit against the 
infringer.168 A Callaway spokesperson stated that they received 
                                                          
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 
777, 831 (2004). 
166 According to the company website, Callaway Golf Company’s 
philosophy is to “help every golfer become a better golfer.” Callaway Golf, 
Corporate Philosophy, http://www.callawaygolf.com/en.cg.Corporate. 
OurPhilosophy.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
167 Bobelian, supra note 8, at col.4. 
168 Id. Callaway Golf Company actively seeks out counterfeiters and 
brings suit both domestically and internationally. See id.; Press Release, 
Callaway Golf, Thai Police Raid Golf Club Counterfeiters (Nov. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www.callawaygolf.com/mediacenter/pressReleases.aspx?pi
d20051102. In a recent police raid in Bangkok, Thailand, two people were 
arrested and $100,000 worth of counterfeit goods was seized. Id. Further, the 
Thai police,  
[a]cting on a complaint filed by attorneys representing Callaway 
Golf and five other U.S. golf equipment manufacturers . . . 
raided both a retail store and its associated warehouse. The 
Commissioner of the Bangkok government’s Central 
Investigative Bureau, Police Lieutenant-General Montree 
Jamran, reported that police raiders seized more than 6500 
counterfeit clubs and other accessories. The two persons arrested 
in the counterfeiting operation were charged with trademark 
infringement under the Thai Trademark Act. Thailand’s criminal 
law provides for a sentence of 2 years imprisonment and a fine 
of US $5,000 for this offense.  
Counterfeit products, including golf clubs and golf balls, are 
prevalent in Thailand and China. Numerous golf shops carry 
large inventories of counterfeit golf equipment, selling to local 
FAVRE 3/4/2007  12:05 AM 
 PROTECTING BRAND INTEGRITY 197 
“‘excellent cooperation from eBay’” and that “the process works 
almost perfectly” with limited “sellers complaining they were 
wrongly shut down.”169 On a typical day, Callaway investigators 
locate three to six suspects operating on eBay.170 Callaway’s 
successful partnership with eBay directly combated the issue by 
holding the counterfeiter directly liable and building a 
relationship between the two companies.171 
Kate Spade172 also worked with eBay’s VeRO program to 
develop a creative strategy to combat counterfeiting of their 
luxury handbag line. The company hired a team of law students 
to monitor online auctions, including eBay, for counterfeit 
goods.173 The students reviewed detailed archives of Kate Spade 
                                                          
residents and tourists. Some of this product finds its way to the 
Internet, where it is marketed on retail web sites and auction 
sites. Callaway Golf and other U.S. manufacturers of premium 
brand golf equipment established a joint effort in 2004 to 
petition foreign governments in the fight against counterfeiting. 
This industry effort has led to enforcement actions by Thai and 
Chinese government authorities against counterfeit factories, 
warehouses, and retailers. More than 100,000 counterfeit golf 
clubs, balls, and accessories have been seized and destroyed, as 
well as factory equipment used to manufacture fakes. The street 
value of seized goods is in the millions of dollars. 
Id. 
169 Bobelian, supra note 8, at col.4. 
170 Id. 
171 Callaway recently added a consumer warning on its website stating 
that,  
consumers in the United States, Europe, Australia, and Canada 
have recently purchased sets of so-called “brand new Callaway 
Golf clubs” at very low prices on eBay.com and other Internet 
auction sites. These clubs and bags were in fact low-quality 
fakes. Callaway Golf’s authorized retailers are not permitted to 
sell new Callaway Golf clubs on eBay.com.  
Callaway Golf, Consumer Alert: Fake Clubs Sold on Auction Sites, 
http://www.callawaygolf.com/en.cg.ContactUs.ConsumerAlertCounterfeitClu
bs.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
172 For more information, see Kate Spade, http://www.katespade.com 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
173 Dan Nissanoff, Op-Ed: Tiffany Actually Loses If It Wins eBay 
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collections, identified counterfeit items, and used eBay tools to 
report the offenders and terminate the auctions.174 Strong brands 
such as Callaway and Kate Spade “already know what Tiffany 
and many other companies have yet to realize—that the 
secondary market is a good thing for brands because it actually 
increases the value of their products in the primary market.”175 
As these examples demonstrate, partnership with online auction 
houses and not litigation can help deter counterfeiters, both 
strengthening brand defense strategies and increasing brand 
value.176 
III.  PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Legislative solutions do not currently address secondary 
trademark liability of online auction houses, although various 
recommendations have been made by academics. One proposed 
solution is to create a scheme of intermediary liability where the 
auction house is responsible for searching and monitoring its 
marketplace.177 It is argued that as the “least cost avoider”178 in 
                                                          




176 The creation of “robust secondary online sales for their goods 
presents companies with many exciting opportunities to strengthen brand 
loyalty and grow their sales, but the initial reaction of too many companies 
has been to simply try to clamp down. That strategy is not only ineffective, 
it’s actually high risk.” NISSANOFF, supra note 16, at 161-62. 
177 Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239 (2005). 
178 The burden of managing a risk is placed on the party who can 
manage it most cheaply (the least cost avoider).  
The Internet’s rise has brought about three changes that make 
intermediaries more likely to be least cost avoiders in the 
Internet context than they previously have been in offline 
contexts: (1) an increase in the likelihood that it will be easy to 
identify specific intermediaries for large classes of transactions, 
(2) a reduction in information costs, which makes it easier for 
the intermediaries to monitor the conduct of end users, and (3) 
increased anonymity, which makes remedies against end users 
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the Internet context, the intermediary website is best able to 
prevent the conduct.179 A takedown regime would be 
implemented wherein an online auction house would be 
obligated to remove all counterfeit products for the owners of 
famous marks that made a suitable request.180 To dilute the cost 
of compliance, the auction house could charge content owners a 
reasonable fee for compliance with a statutory mandate to 
remove counterfeit products.181 Still, this solution is 
impracticable. It would require an overwhelming and unrealistic 
burden on online auction houses to monitor millions of listings. 
Additionally, online auction houses are not sufficiently aware of 
the nuances of each trademarked brand in order to properly 
identify a counterfeit good. Training employees at each online 
auction site would be expensive and inefficient. For example, as 
of third quarter 2006, eBay had 212 million registered users, 
“representing a 26% increase over the 168 million” reported the 
year prior.182 eBay’s new listings totaled 584 million for the 
quarter, 27% higher than the new listings reported in the third 
quarter 2005.183 The logistics involved in each online auction 
site monitoring every individual listing would be overwhelming, 
unreasonable and ineffective. 
Another legislative recommendation is to enact a digital safe 
                                                          
generally less effective.  
Id. at 243. 
179 Id. at 249. 
[I]ntermediaries are more likely to be least cost avoiders . . .  
[for the following reasons]: (1) an increase in the likelihood that 
it will be easy to identify specific intermediaries for large classes 
of transactions, (2) a reduction in the information costs which 
makes it easier for the intermediaries to monitor the conduct of 
end users, (3) and increased anonymity, which makes remedies 
against end users generally less effective. 
Id at 240. 
180 Id. at 270. 
181 Id. at 270-71. 
182 Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. Announces Third Quarter 2006 
Financial Results (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://investor.ebay.com/ 
releases.cfm. 
183 Id. 
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harbor amendment to the Lanham Act, comparable to the 
DMCA. The DMCA exception provides a safe harbor184 to 
online service providers185 who promptly take down 
inappropriate content after receiving notice of copyright 
infringement from a copyright owner. In order to benefit from 
the proposed exception, the auction house would have to comply 
with a three-part statute based on “knowledge, financial benefit, 
and prompt take-down procedures.”186 The knowledge prong is 
satisfied when the site cannot possess “either knowledge of the 
direct trademark infringement or knowledge of conditions that 
make the infringement obvious.”187 If direct knowledge later 
becomes available, the auction house must promptly take down 
                                                          
184 A safe harbor is available if the defendant meets a three-prong test. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (1999). In Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., the District 
Court of California characterized the safe harbor as requiring the following: 
First, the service provider must demonstrate that it does not 
have actual knowledge that an activity using the material stored 
on its website is infringing or an awareness of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. 
Alternatively, the service provider must show that it 
expeditiously removed or disabled access to the problematic 
material upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of infringing 
activity. Second, the service provider must show it does not 
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity if the service provider has the right and ability to control 
such activity. Third, the service provider must show that it 
responded expeditiously to remove the material that is the 
subject of infringing activity upon receiving notification of the 
claimed infringement in the manner described in Section 
512(c)(3). 
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (D. Cal. 2001) 
(internal citations omitted).  
185 The DMCA defines a service provider as “a provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore” and an 
“entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, 
of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the 
material as sent or received.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (1999). 
186 Sunderji, supra note 152, at 941. One proposed solution is 
substantially based on the DMCA safe harbor. 
187 Id. 
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the infringed listing.188 To satisfy the financial benefit prong, the 
online auction house must not gain profit as a “direct result of 
the infringing activity if it possesses control over the 
instrumentality used to infringe.”189 To comply with the final 
prong, the site must promptly take down infringing listings upon 
being alerted by the trademark owner.190 Creating a safe harbor 
against secondary trademark liability would motivate online 
auction houses to create reporting infrastructures similar to 
eBay’s VeRO program and allow them to reallocate resources 
from defending lawsuits to working with trademark owners to 
protect against counterfeiting. The safe harbor provision under 
the Lanham Act, like the DMCA, would provide strong 
incentives for service providers and trademark owners to partner 
in detecting and dealing with infringers.191 
Although legislative solutions regarding third-party 
intermediaries might strengthen reporting structures and create 
an opportunity to learn more details about the counterfeiters, 
they will not reduce the existence of counterfeit goods, or re-
value damaged brands. The majority of counterfeit items sold on 
the Internet are a small part of a larger, global counterfeit 
concern.192 The most effective solution to help trademark owners 
                                                          
188 Id.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. Under the current DMCA, Section 512(g)(1) offers service 
providers a safe harbor from copyright liability for wrongful takedown, but 
conditions that safe harbor on 512(g)(2), which requires service providers to 
notify targets that they will put back material if a counter-notice is received. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). While a service provider might, in theory, “be 
subject to tort or contractual liability for a wrongful takedown of content, in 
practice, service providers limit their liability with their terms of service.” 
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Symposium Review: Efficient Process or 
“Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
621, 629 (2006). 
191 eBay qualified for protection under the DMCA. Hendrickson v. 
eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal., 2001). 
192 Four primary factors contribute to the exponential growth of 
counterfeiting: the widespread availability of technology, the increased 
globalization of trade, limited legal penalties and the influence of organized 
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is to partner with the government and demand a stronger and 
more targeted anti-counterfeiting regime, relying on criminal 
statutes such as the Trademark Counterfeiting Act (“TCA”).193 
In March 2004, Christopher Wray, Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, 
addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee on Counterfeiting and 
Theft of Tangible Intellectual Property.194 Wray testified that: 
“We are at a pivotal time in the history of intellectual property 
rights enforcement. A number of factors195 have come together 
to create unprecedented challenges to intellectual property rights 
holders and to law enforcement.” He further noted that there 
exists only “sporadic and inconsistent enforcement throughout 
the world, which is compounded by the emergence of organized 
crime syndicates in international piracy and counterfeiting. 
Counterfeiters have become experts at infringing on trademarks 
                                                          
crime and terrorists. HOPKINS, supra note 25, at 5-8. 
193 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2000).  Under the TCA, one can be criminally 
liable for the intentional trafficking of counterfeit goods or services.  Id.  An 
individual who “intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods . . .  and 
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark” may face a prison term of not more than 
ten years, a fine of up to $2M, or both.  Id.  To prove a violation, “the 
government must establish that: (i) the defendant trafficked or attempted to 
traffic in goods or services; (ii) such trafficking or attempt was intentional; 
(iii) the defendant used a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such 
goods or services; and (iv) the defendant knew that the mark so used was 
counterfeit.”  United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(presenting requirements for prosecuting criminal trademark counterfeiting 
offense) quoting United States v. Sultan, 115 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1997). 
194 Lauren D. Amendolara, Knocking Off Knock-offs: Effectuating the 
Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 823-24 (2005) (quoting Counterfeiting and 
Theft of Tangible Intellectual Property: Challenges and Solutions: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1119&wit_id=3192 (Mar. 23, 
2004)). 
195 Some of these factors include: (1) the increase value of intellectual 
property rights; (2) the ease and low cost of reproducing and distributing 
copyrighted and trademarked products; (3) the simplicity with which millions 
of illegal copies can be disseminated throughout the world over the Internet; 
(4) the difficulty of detection; and (5) the ability to make a perfect or near 
perfect copy of the original. Id. at 823. 
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and evading the law.” Suggestions made to reduce the 
trafficking in counterfeit goods include: strengthening the 
language of the TCA,196 making counterfeit investigations a 
priority with federal law enforcement agencies, and heightening 
border security with regard to counterfeit products.197 Wray 
concluded his testimony by adding that “without stronger 
protection, trademarks will lose their value and place within 
American business transactions.”198 
In 2005, the Bush administration created an initiative to 
combat global piracy and counterfeiting called the Strategy 
Targeting Organized Piracy (“STOP”).199 Attorney General 
Alberto R. Gonzales, while speaking at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Summit, highlighted 
the Justice Department’s STOP initiative200 and announced a 
                                                          
196 On March 16, 2006, the Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods 
Act, (H.R. 32) became law. The Act amends the Anti-Counterfeiting Statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 2320, to close the loophole exposed by the Tenth Circuit in the 
United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that persons 
who sold counterfeit labels that were not actually attached to goods did not 
violate the statute). The new Act also provides for: (1) the forfeiture and 
destruction of counterfeit goods and any machinery used to make such goods; 
(2) the forfeiture of any property and/or assets derived from counterfeiting; 
(3) modification of the definition of trafficking to include making, importing, 
exporting, possession, or control of counterfeit goods with intent to distribute 
them; and 4) modification of the definition of financial gain to include the 
receipt of or expected receipt of anything of value. 18 U.S.C. § 2320. 
197 Amendolara, supra note 194, at 824. 
198 Id. 
199 Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy, http://www.stopfakes.gov/ (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
200 Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Announces Intellectual 
Property Legislation, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 10, 2005, available at 
http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=56509.  
As part of the STOP initiative, the Department created the Task 
Force on Intellectual Property in 2004. In October 2004, the 
Task Force issued a comprehensive report with 
recommendations to increase the Department’s effectiveness in 
protecting intellectual property rights and enforcing federal 
intellectual property laws. In February 2005, Attorney General 
Gonzales renewed the Department’s commitment to the Task 
Force, announcing that the Department would implement all of 
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comprehensive legislative proposal entitled the Intellectual 
Property Protection Act of 2005 (IPPA). The IPPA would 
“strengthen penalties for repeat copyright criminals, expand 
criminal intellectual property protection, and add critical 
investigative tools for both criminal and civil enforcement.”201 
Also, the FBI created a new Cyber Division to address online 
theft of intellectual property and trade secrets.202 Given the 
government’s creation of task forces, it is clear that the 
legislature is aware of the issue of rampant counterfeiting on the 
Internet and has chosen to remain silent on requiring active 
monitoring of auction sites. Until the issue of counterfeit goods 
is dealt with globally, piece-meal legislation solely addressing 
liability of online marketplaces in the U.S. will only work as a 
stop-gap solution. 
IV.  CREATIVE WAYS TO PROTECT BRAND IDENTITY 
Intellectual property owners have gotten creative and 
aggressive regarding the management of their brands. 
Companies, like Tiffany, with million dollar brands and easily 
                                                          
the IP Task Force report’s recommendations and would continue 
its aggressive strategy.  
Id. 
201 If enacted, the proposed Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2005 
would enhance the Department’s ability to pursue crimes and protect the 
intellectual property rights of citizens and industries. The Act includes 
provisions to: [i]mplement broad forfeiture reforms to ensure the ability to 
forfeit property, including illicit proceeds, derived from or used in the 
commission of criminal intellectual property offenses; [c]riminalize 
intellectual property theft motivated by any type of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain; and [s]trengthen restitution provisions for victim 
companies and rights holders in order to maximize protection for those who 
suffer most from these crimes. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales 
Announces Intellectual Property Legislation, 
http://www.linuxelectrons.com/article.php/ 20051110200125623 (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2006). 
202 For a detailed analysis of criminalizing intellectual property 
violations, see Breana C. Smith, et al, Intellectual Property Crimes, 43 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 663 (2006). 
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replicated products require strong programs to combat 
counterfeiting. Arguably, blanket liability should not fall onto 
online auction houses when the corporate brand-owners have the 
resources and the ability to partner and internalize the work. If a 
company gains substantial value from its brand,203 it is 
reasonable to assume that the company should manage financial 
risk internally and build an infrastructure to protect and monitor 
that brand. 
In addition to the varied actions of the online auction houses, 
trademark owners have attempted a wide array of measures to 
protect their brand identity from rampant counterfeiting. Some 
brand owners hire full-service corporate identity management 
companies to help protect their brands online.204 MarkMonitor, 
for example, offers various services that include domain name 
portfolio management, brand monitoring and fraud protection.205 
MarkMonitor works with more than 37% of Fortune 100 
companies, and 17% of Global 500 companies.206 The 
company’s computer technology identifies instances of online 
                                                          
203 Al Ehrbar, Breakaway Brands, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 2005, at 154. 
A company’s intangible value 
is its market value minus its tangible capital (i.e., property, 
plant, equipment, and net working capital). A BrandEconomic 
analysis found that companies with strong, well-regarded brands 
had an intangible value of 250% of annual sales; companies with 
listless brands had one of only 70%. In important ways, though, 
the value of a brand is incalculable. A rising brand secures more 
customer loyalty, higher margins, greater pricing flexibility, and 
new opportunities for growth. And brands on the way up, 
BrandEconomics research shows, ride through economic 
downturns with less trauma. “The combination of faster growth 
with less risk . . . is business nirvana.” 
Id. 
204 McDonald’s relies on trademark watch services to scour trademark 
offices around the world and keep the company apprised of potentially 
infringing registrations. Daphne Eviatar, Guarding the Golden Arches: It 
Takes a Global Village to Protect McDonald’s Trademark, IP LAW & 
BUSINESS (Jan. 2005). 
205 MarkMonitor, http://www.markmonitor.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 
27, 2006). 
206 Id. 
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abuse and provides central locations for managing all activities 
associated with taking action against online counterfeiters.207 
Other companies hire private investigators, such as IP 
Cybercrime, to troll through auctions for culprits.208 The private 
investigators initially identify small mom-and-pop sellers in 
hopes of uncovering larger distributors.209 Firms have also 
established entire businesses out of managing take-down notices 
for trademark owners. OpSec Security210 uses proprietary 
technology to comb through eBay’s database, through a special 
deal with the auction house, and locate trademark problems for 
well-established brands.211 The technology automates delivery of 
takedown notices, with an average of 10,000 each month just on 
eBay alone.212 Technological advances will continue to provide 
new and innovative options for monitoring online 
infringements.213 
Companies also create new departments and implement legal 
policies214 within their organizations to oversee counterfeiting 
                                                          
207 MarkMonitor, Protect Corporate Brands, Customers and Revenue 
against Online Counterfeit and Gray Market Sales, 
http://www.markmonitor.com/ solutions/graymarket/ (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006). 
208 Dean Takahashi, Online Auction Counterfeit Spurs Companies to 
Fight Back, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2006. 
209 Id. 
210 OpSec Security recently purchased GenuOne, Inc. in 2006. For 
company history, see http://www.opsecsecurity.com/company/history.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
211 Bob Sullivan, eBay Fights its Toughest Legal Battle, MSNBC.com 
(Sep. 21, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6030048/. 
212 Id. 
213 Cheaper avenues exist for those smaller companies who may not have 
the budget to implement an intricate technology infrastructure. Brandcrawler 
is an online searching robot that scans 40 million websites for specific words 
or phrases. Bulkregister, http://www2.bulkregister.com/prBrAnnPreMem.php 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2006). The service, offered through bulkregister.com, 
provides monthly reports to subscribers to locate websites that are using a 
brand wrongly or selling a product without permission. Id. The report fee is 
$199. Id. 
214 An internal can include educating: 
employees on brand integration along with brand protection; 
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issues and protect brands from misuse. Although costly, these 
organizations understand the long-term financial implications of 
not adequately monitoring a company’s brand. To combat the 
growing problem with counterfeiting, Philip Morris created a 
brand integrity department in 2002 solely to disrupt contraband 
cigarette trafficking.215 Other companies, like McDonald’s, rely 
on an informal network of employees, customers, local franchise 
owners, and suppliers to report infringements to the brand 
protection group.216 Sheila Lehr, McDonald’s managing counsel 
and lead trademark lawyer, recommends developing close ties 
with local franchise owners and food companies in each country 
where the company operates.217 
Other companies have banded together to monitor auction 
sites, identify individuals and groups selling infringing goods, 
and collectively sue infringers. For instance, the Software and 
Information Industry Association (“SIIA”) is a software trade 
group with members including Apple Computer, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM and Time Warner, Inc.218 In 2006, SIIA unveiled 
the Auction Litigation Program which tracks the incidence of 
eBay and Yahoo! Auctions offering pirated software and files 
suits against the most egregious.219 On May 15, 2006, SIIA filed 
                                                          
limit ownership of the brand through a holding company to 
insulate the brand from misuse; limit authority to approve use, 
licensing, and alteration of the brand by creating either a 
trademark czar or brand standards committee to oversee such 
activities; and create a single source for accessing downloadable 
reproductions of the brand that educates employees on use 
policies and the consequences of misuse. 
TALCOTT J. FRANKLIN, PROTECTING THE BRAND: A CONCISE GUIDE TO 
PROMOTING, MAINTAINING, AND PROTECTING A COMPANY’S MOST 
VALUABLE ASSET 72 (2003). 
215 Daphne Eviatar, At Philip Morris, Jack Holleran Smokes Out 
Smugglers and Counterfeiters, IP LAW & BUSINESS (Jan. 2005). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 SIIA List of Members, http://www.siia.net/membership/ 
memberlist.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
219 SIIA Anti-Piracy, http://www.siia.net/piracy/internet.asp (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2006). 
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a copyright infringement suit220 in the District Court, Central 
District of California, against three defendants for selling 
software pirated from Symantec Corporation and McAfee, Inc. 
sold through eBay auctions in the fall of 2005. The efforts of 
SIIA have decreased the number of illegal auctions of 
software.221 Following the announcement of the lawsuits, there 
was a 20-50% decrease in Symantec and McAfee pirated 
software auctions placed on eBay.222 The partnership between 
SIIA and companies in the software and digital content industry 
proved a successful way to battle copyright infringers, and could 
easily be applied in the trademark context. 
A trademark right is one that is earned and it is the burden 
of the trademark owner to be vigilant in monitoring the use of 
the mark. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the corporate 
brand-owner to protect and defend its trademark rights, in 
partnership with outside parties.223 Open communication with 
intermediaries who provide online distribution forums is 
essential, as they are “online ambassadors of the brand.”224 If 
                                                          
220 SIAA Press Release, http://www.siia.net/press/releases/ 
20060516Auction_Lit.pdf. Peter Beruk of McAfee, Inc. noted that, “. . . 
professional criminals [are] using popular auction sites like eBay to rip off 
innocent people. At the same time, we hope that Internet auction providers 
will offer a greater commitment to work with copyright holders to stem the 
tide of infringing sales of our software in order to protect the buying public 
from receiving illegitimate goods.” Id. 
221 SIAA Press Release, http://www.siia.net/press/releases/ 
Auction_Piracy_Litigation_Impact.pdf. SIIA monitored the prevalence of 
eBay actions selling 18 types of pirated software products and found that the 
lawsuits had a discernable impact of the number of illegal auctions posted.  
Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Requiring online auction houses like eBay to verify the authenticity of 
products would “‘be like ordering newspapers to take responsibility for the 
authenticity of the goods’” that appear in classified advertising. NISSANOFF, 
supra note 16, at 168 quoting Psst, Wanna Buy a Cheap Bracelet? THE 
ECONOMIST, July 3, 2004. “’In the end, it is the job of a brand’s owner to 
defend its intellectual property rights, although that owner clearly deserves 
the active co-operation of any middleman whose services are being used to 
peddle fakes.’” Id. 
224 “[P]artner roles have expanded to the extent that a customer’s 
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neglected, these partners can “undermine the customer 
experience, destroy brand equity, and divert revenues to 
competitors.”225 Intellectual property owners must leverage the 
reporting programs implemented by the third party 
intermediaries and offer additional solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of rampant counterfeiting and brand dilution will 
only increase in the future, especially as U.S. online auction 
houses broaden their economic platforms226 and enter the 
international market.227 As many countries do not have stringent 
                                                          
exposure to a brand is entirely outside the brand owner’s direct control, from 
the point of brand awareness through fulfillment.” BRIAN H. MURRAY, 
DEFENDING THE BRAND: AGGRESSIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING YOUR 
BRAND IN THE ONLINE ARENA 75 (2004). 
225 Id. at 76. 
226 For example, eBay “owns the online shopping comparison service 
Shopping.com, the listing site Rent.com, used-car dealer AutoTrader.com, 
and even a percentage of the grassroots classifieds phenom Craigslist.”  
NISSANOFF, supra note 16, at 71. 
227 eBay Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 38 (Oct. 20, 2005), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000095013405008154/f0
7687e10vq.htm. Currently, eBay has online auction websites in the United 
States, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
and the United Kingdom. Id. at 6. Yahoo!, Inc. recently became a 40% 
owner in Chinese online marketplace alibaba.com, a website known for 
having issues with counterfeit goods. Alibaba, a Chinese online marketplace, 
aggregates importer traffic and exporter content to create a community in 
support of global trade. Alibaba, http://alibaba.com (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006). The Alibaba businesses have more than 14 million registered users in 
200 countries and territories, adding 18,000 new members daily. Id. In 2004, 
over US $4 billion in trade was estimated to have come from buyers and 
sellers connecting through Alibaba sites. Id. Alibaba’s growing reputation and 
brand recognition in the United States is soon to revival that of eBay. Such a 
presence results in a tremendous opportunity for counterfeit producers. 
Alibaba’s insufficient tracking measures and use of background checks, 
partnered with its lack of formal process to enable verified rights owners to 
report infringements, will result in rampant counterfeiting.  Id. 
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laws protecting copyright and trademarks,228 it is likely that 
complaints against online auction houses will continue to 
surface. 
By remaining silent on whether online auction houses create 
a forum deserving of contributory or vicarious trademark 
liability, the courts and legislature should create enough 
apprehension to compel third party intermediaries to actively 
partner with trademark and brand owners to remove counterfeit 
auctions and create brand management strategies. The recent 
copyright litigation involving Internet service providers should 
also create an incentive to induce smaller online auction houses 
to build or strengthen their notification, take-down, and 
monitoring processes. Trademark owners need to accept that 
online auctions are the world’s largest and fastest growing 
channels of commerce. They need to embrace these new 
channels as an opportunity to promote their brand, and 
proactively partner with third-party intermediaries to foster open 
dialogue and creative problem-solving. 
                                                          
228 Amendolara, supra note 194, at 816. 
